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Drained does not mean safe to dismantle: the Gyeongju press explosion

Field Safety Briefing editorial teamPublished Updated

An explosion and fire during press dismantling in Gyeongju on 8 September 2026 reportedly killed one worker and seriously injured two.

30-second summary

What happened: An explosion/fire occurred during oxygen cutting to dismantle a press in Gyeongju.

Harm: Reporting recorded 1 death and 2 serious injuries.

Investigation: A residual-oil mechanism was reported as possible; a final cause has not been announced.

At your site: Check the actual fluid data and residual material/energy treatment for the component to be cut.

Incident sequence and working conditions

NoCut News reported the incident during press dismantling at a waste-processing factory in Gangdong-myeon, Gyeongju. MBC reported that the factory had been idle for over 1 year and an outside contractor was performing the work. The official accident alert places oxygen cutting at the press’s upper part.

The cordoned factory after the Gyeongju explosion
The cordoned factory after the Gyeongju explosion · Son Dae-seong (손대성) / Yonhap News Agency (연합뉴스) · 2026-09-08 · Source photograph

MBC relayed a representative’s statement that oil had been drained through a hose. The report described a possible relationship between residual cylinder oil and sparks while noting the police/fire investigation. The fluid’s product identity and residual quantity are absent from public reporting.

Equipment and process principles — technical explanation

Hydraulic-fluid flammability: As a manufacturer SDS example, Shell Tellus S2 MX 46 v1.8 (2026-05-19) gives a flash point of 230°C (ISO 2592), typical vapour flammability limits of 1–10 vol% and auto-ignition temperature above 320°C. These belong to that product. Identify the fluid actually used, its temperature and release form.

HSE defines flash point through a specified test of vapour generation and momentary ignition. Fine liquid droplets form a mist, distinct from vapour. Its MISTS2 guidance notes that high-flash-point fluids such as hydraulic oils can ignite/explode below their flash points as mists. Evaluate substance and release form while distinguishing vapour from droplets.

In hydraulic systems, fluid pressure transmits force, while heavy components can move under gravity after supply isolation. HSE HSG253 distinguishes removal of stored energy/residual contents from proving isolation. A press dismantling plan must address drainage scope, connected supply paths and support/lifting sequence.

Publicly reported timeline

TimeReported factSource
2026-09-08, about 11:26Explosion/fire during press dismantling; oxygen cutting reportedNoCut News, 2026-09-08
2026-09-08, about 12:06Fire extinguished; 1 death, 2 serious injuries and partial building damage reportedNoCut News, 2026-09-08
2026-09-08 follow-upLong-idle factory, contractor dismantling and representative’s drainage accountMBC Newsdesk

Harm and response

Dismantling addresses combustible contents and movement of cut members together. Establish internal-treatment scope before deciding hot-work use and spark-affected areas. Elevated work also requires a platform and access route for withdrawal after an alarm.

Drained does not mean safe to dismantle: the Gyeongju press explosion — Safety Kim educational illustration

Questions for your site

QuestionHow to check
Is the SDS for the actual hydraulic fluid available?Identify product, flash point and hazards alongside temperature/release form.
Does drainage cover the component to be cut?Trace drains, cylinders and enclosed spaces against the treated scope.
Are residual pressure and connected supply controlled?Check isolation positions, tags, proving and restart protection.
What supports the remaining member after cutting?Reconcile cutting order, support/lifting and personnel positions.
Do permit measurement records match the work time?Check target gas, sample locations, remeasurement conditions and missing records.
Are spark-affected areas and escape routes prepared?Check nearby/lower combustible protection, watch position and access route.

Application at Korean workplaces

Article 92 requires shutdown and restart protection for hazardous maintenance, plus measures such as prior release of compressed gas/liquid where hazardous. Article 239 restricts ignition sources in explosion/fire-risk locations; Article 240 requires prior treatment of piping/vessels potentially containing flammable oil or other specified material. Match Article 241’s preparation, combustible protection, ventilation, training, pre-work verification and written posting to the actual task.

Rules on Occupational Safety and Health Standards: MOEL Ordinance No. 450; effective March 2, 2026.

References

Related cases

The residual-pressure/contents article distinguishes drainage from verified removal. The fire-watch article covers exposed surroundings and the watcher’s role. Compare internal preparation with external spark protection.