Can another trade ignite your work area?: The 2020 Icheon warehouse construction fire

Field Safety Briefing editorial teamPublished 2026-09-28Updated 2026-10-07

How could welding sparks travel between work on different floors and combustible materials?

30-second summary

The April 29, 2020 fire at a warehouse under construction in Icheon killed 38 people and injured 10. Police identified welding on basement level 2 as the ignition source. The trial court considered ignition there unlikely and identified a possible route from welding at a third-floor elevator down the shaft. A custodial sentence for the contractor’s site manager and an acquittal for the client’s representative became final after appeal.

The work interface extends beyond one welding point: when insulation arrives, where different contractors work, which openings can carry sparks and how people escape from several levels. Combustible interior materials and basement escape routes also contributed to the consequences of the 2008 Icheon cold-store fire.

Illustrated reconstruction showing welding sparks reaching combustible insulation — Illustrated reconstruction · Welding sparks reaching combustible insulation — Not a photograph of the incident. This illustrates the ignition route in interim police findings. Layout, spark travel distance and the silhouette location are illustrative. · Incident source

Work background and incident sequence

Finishing and equipment installation were under way at the cold-storage construction site. Police examined oxygen-fuel welding of cooler piping on basement level 2, polyurethane application and overlapping contractor work. Severe burning near a cooler and open oxygen and LPG cylinder valves informed the June interim finding. Police also identified closed escape routes and missing temporary fire protection as aggravating factors.

On April 30, police and forensic specialists conducted the first joint examination and searched the contractor, client, supervision and design firms. The inquiry covered both personnel on site and responsibility for design and programme decisions. Prosecutors charged nine people in July. The prosecution’s ignition-location account was subsequently examined in court.

On December 29, 2020, the trial court found the charged basement-cooler ignition account insufficiently established. It considered sparks descending an elevator shaft from third-floor welding a possible route and acquitted four of the nine individuals. It imposed the heaviest sentence on the contractor’s site manager, including consideration of the increased risk associated with attempts to shorten the programme.

On July 16, 2021, the appellate court acquitted the client’s project-team leader after examining the law applicable to the passage-closure decision, the client’s powers and whether specific instructions had been given to the contractor or workers. Convictions remained for the contractor’s site manager, another contractor representative and the supervision representative, with reduced sentences. The subcontractor representative’s fine concerned unregistered construction and re-subcontracting, rather than criminal responsibility for the fire deaths.

Equipment and work principles

Welding-spark exposure extends beyond the welder’s floor. Sparks can pass through openings or enter insulation joints, where burning may be hidden. Where combustibles adjoin a metal sheet, heat transfer to the opposite side also needs assessment. A blanket in front of the welding point does not establish protection behind or below it.

HSE HSG168 describes conduction, convection, radiation and spread through concealed spaces. Overlay hot-work locations with insulation work areas and separate activities that cannot safely coexist. If combustibles cannot be relocated, change the method or timing and reassess protection and watch coverage.

A fire watch has duties beyond extinguishing a fire. Placement must permit observation of exposed opposite-side and lower spaces and a means to stop work and warn occupants. If one person cannot watch several compartments, adjust staffing or work scope. The permit’s end and completion of ember checks should be determined for actual conditions rather than assumed identical.

Knowing that insulation and hot work occur on the same day is not coordination. Time separation requires confirmation that the first activity ended, residual hazards were removed and the next may begin. Delays or deliveries can create overlap despite the schedule. Check actual floor-level activity before starting and reconcile permit conditions when another contractor changes work.

On January 7, 2008, an explosion and fire during final work at an Icheon cold store killed 40 people. The National Emergency Management Agency’s next-day release identified smoke from polyurethane, a difficult route from inner work areas to the exit and failed initial suppression as aggravating factors; the precise ignition cause was still under investigation. The recurring conditions were interior work among combustible insulation and escape routes vulnerable to fire and smoke.

The Banyan Tree construction fire in Busan (SM-036) is another case concerning insulation and hot work inside an unfinished building. In applying the comparison, map where the tasks affect the same compartment, lower levels and passages, rather than only comparing delivery and permit dates. A permit based on completed fire compartments can miss openings and shafts that remain unsealed. Define the affected area using the openings present at the actual work stage.

Published chronology and investigation findings

On November 25, 2021, the Supreme Court dismissed all appeals in case 2021Do10383. It upheld findings of insufficient proof on specified charges concerning work plans, drawings, risk assessment, spark control and written notices. For the remaining convictions involving contractor and supervision personnel, it found no legal error in the assessment of duty of care and causation.

The Supreme Court also held that certain contractor and supervision defendants could not appeal solely on the ground that their sentences were excessive: their sentences fell outside the statutory range permitting that ground. Following the appellate assessment of facts and sentence, the Supreme Court concluded the case by reviewing the legal grounds raised on appeal.

When	Established account	Source
2020-04-29 about 13:30	Fire at the warehouse construction site	Newsis, 2020-12-29 · incident account
2020-04-29 18:42	Fire extinguished	Same article · final paragraph
2020-04-30	First joint examination; four project firms searched	Newsis, 2020-05-01
2020-06-15	Police interim finding: suspected basement-level 2 welding ignition	Yonhap · interim investigation
2020-06-18	Government construction fire-safety programme announced	MOEL · planning, construction and response
2020-12-29	Trial convictions and acquittals; ignition-location evidence assessed	Newsis · sentences by role
2021-07-16	Appeal: client representative acquitted; other sentences reduced	News1/Financial News · appeal
2021-11-25	All Supreme Court appeals dismissed	2021Do10383 · judgment pp.2–4

Court outcomes by role

Role	Trial · 2020-12-29	Appeal · 2021-07-16 → final
Contractor’s site manager	3 years 6 months’ imprisonment	3 years’ imprisonment
Contractor representative	2 years 3 months’ imprisonment without labor	2 years’ imprisonment without labor
Supervision representative	1 year 8 months’ imprisonment without labor	1 year 6 months’ imprisonment without labor
Client’s project-team leader	8 months’ imprisonment without labor, suspended for 2 years	Acquitted
Subcontractor representative	KRW 7 million fine for unregistered construction and re-subcontracting breaches	Upheld
Contractor company	KRW 30 million fine	Upheld

Consequences and emergency response

The toll of 38 deaths and 10 injuries extended beyond the immediate work point. Escape routes need to be communicated to everyone on site, including insulation, electrical and mechanical trades. Verify temporary fire facilities and warnings as work progresses and ensure safe routes remain available with fire doors closed.

Sparks reaching another contractor’s work area require more than an extra blanket at the receiving end. Review authorization for both the ignition-producing activity and the combustible work, and decide which must stop first. Before restart, inspect screen placement, edge gaps and lower openings.

On June 18, 2020, the government announced a joint construction-site fire-safety programme covering adequate schedules, combustible building materials, coordination of hazardous work, escape arrangements and drills through the construction stages. It addressed the changing compartments and temporary routes that completed-building inspections alone could not control.

The programme proposed controls on simultaneous combustible-material and hot-work operations, gas alarms and forced ventilation, main-contractor coordination of subcontract work, and emergency plans. These were policy proposals in 2020. Duties for current work follow the current provisions set out below.

Can another trade ignite your work area?: The 2020 Icheon warehouse construction fire — Safety Kim educational illustration

Questions for your site

Question	How to check
Can another contractor’s sparks reach our area?	Map work points, spark travel and combustibles together.
What lies beyond and below the blanket?	Inspect openings and insulation joints.
Who confirms that incompatible activities are separated in time?	Reconcile completion, residual-hazard removal and permission to start.
Have escape routes been rechecked after work changes?	Walk from the work area to the exit and assembly point.

Application at Korean sites

Comparable work in Korea is subject to the Rules on Occupational Safety and Health Standards, MOEL Ordinance No. 450, effective 2026-03-02. The following concerns present work; findings about the incident depend on its investigation and proceedings.

Article 239 prohibits ignition-producing or potentially hot equipment at or above locations with specified fire or explosion hazards. A hot-work permit does not waive the prohibition.

Article 241 covers procedures, hazardous-material inventories, combustible protection, extinguishing equipment, spark control, ventilation and escape training. Its current text also addresses pre-work checks, posted information and certification of welding blankets.

Article 241-2 defines fire-watch placement conditions and exceptions, alarm checks, evacuation duties and equipment. Consider visibility of opposite surfaces and lower areas.